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Documenting the American 
Military Experience in the Iraq 
and Afghanistan Wars
Heather Soyka and Eliot Wilczek
ABSTRACT 
This essay reviews the challenges of documenting the American military experience 
in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It looks at the appraisal challenges presented 
by the complexities of counterinsurgency warfare. It then examines the nature of 
current military records with a focus on their volume and mix of structured and 
informal documents and data. Finally, it reviews the recordkeeping challenges faced 
by the military during these two wars. This essay addresses issues of broad archival 
concern beyond just military records: documenting complex activities and events, 
appraising big data and informal data, and effectively managing active records.1
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America’s engagements in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have come at a significant cost to the United States. As of January 15, 2014, a total of 2,304 
American service members and Defense Department civilians have been killed 
supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), and 4,489 have been 
killed supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn (Iraq). In 
the two conflicts, 51,810 U.S. personnel have been wounded in action.2 Both 
wars come at a combined estimated monetary cost of $3.1 trillion to the United 
States.3 These two engagements have presented this nation with the ongoing 
challenge of providing health care for veterans that will last at least fifty years. 
The two wars were a focal point, if not the focal point, of American foreign 
policy during the first decade of the twenty-first century. The experiences of 
Iraq and Afghanistan have dramatically changed the military.4 These two wars 
clearly merit careful documentation as part of our political, military, cultural, 
and community heritage. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan present several documentary challenges 
to the archival community and to our society as a whole. In this essay, we focus 
on three of these challenges. First, we explore the difficulties in document-
ing counterinsurgencies and the challenges of documenting a military that 
is undertaking a growing set of diverse tasks on behalf of American society. 
Second, we examine the U.S. military’s challenges with creating and keeping 
the records that document operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, we look at 
the nature of U.S. military records from the two wars with a particular focus on 
their size and complexity. The archival literature on accountability and public 
trust in government recordkeeping guides this essay.5 We make an underlying 
assumption that good recordkeeping fosters transparency and accountability 
in government actions and supports the relationship between government and 
the people.6
This essay is limited to a discussion about documenting the American expe-
rience of these two wars. More specifically, it focuses on challenges related to 
documenting the experience of the American military. While the military com-
munity encompasses military and Department of Defense institutions; individ-
ual service members and their families; and civilian communities that tightly 
revolve around the military, this paper primarily focuses on the documentation 
of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars through the operational records of the mili-
tary branch services. Most of this discussion draws on the U.S. Army’s experi-
ence with documenting its operations in Iraq. We do not fully address other 
issues that also have significant implications for the documentation of these 
two wars and future conflicts. These include transparency, openness, and opera-
tional security issues raised by WikiLeaks making close to 500,000 leaked U.S. 
military operational records from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars publicly avail-
able on the Internet. Other issues not addressed include the role of personal and 
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unofficial documents in war, the military’s extensive use of private contractors 
in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, the government’s increased dependence 
on clandestine operations, an emerging American foreign policy strategy that 
features a more light-footed approach to conflicts abroad, and the issue of gov-
ernment secrecy. This essay does not address the documentation of the broader 
American political discourse about the wars or responses to the conduct of both 
wars, such as antiwar protests. This essay also does not address the fight over 
Iraqi government records7 or the broader issue of archives and cultural artifacts 
being targets of destruction and theft during armed conflicts.8 Finally, docu-
menting the American military experience in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
tells only one perspective of these conflicts and obviously is not synonymous 
with documenting both wars in their totality. 
Despite focusing on the American military experience, this documentary 
challenge should engage not just those working in military archives and records 
programs but also a broad range of archivists, records managers, and digital 
curators. Addressing the concerns identified in this essay has wide applicability 
to the archives, records management, and digital curation fields. Documenting 
military engagement in extremely complex conflicts while the armed services 
are also charged with a range of tasks from fighting wars to rebuilding nations 
challenges archivists to think deeply about what they are trying to document 
and what they are trying to achieve when making appraisal decisions. Managing 
and preserving the sea of U.S. military data clearly intersects with other efforts 
to manage and preserve research and government datasets and generally fits 
within the rubric of big data. Finally, the military’s recordkeeping struggles 
demonstrate the critical importance of developing and implementing plans to 
protect and carefully manage records throughout their life cycle, not just when 
and if they reach the archives. 
The Nature of Counterinsurgencies
Documenting the Iraq and Afghanistan wars requires an understanding 
of the nature of these conflicts. Archivists have historically engaged with ques-
tions related to selection and the growing volume of official war records.9 The 
distinct characteristics of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, however, suggest 
the need to consider different appraisal approaches for documenting counterin-
surgencies than for documenting conventional wars. Appraisal of these military 
records also requires an understanding of the role that the military—which 
engages in these conflicts on this country’s behalf—plays in our society.10 
The Department of Defense currently defines counterinsurgency as “com-
prehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to 
address any core grievances.”11 Counterinsurgencies are inherently complex 
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undertakings that emphasize coordinated civil-military efforts, with politi-
cal actions often having more strategic importance than combat operations. 
Documenting COIN is not just about documenting battles and combat. The 
prominent roles of small military units and nonkinetic activities12 in COIN 
campaigns present particular challenges to archivists attempting to document 
counterinsurgency operations.
In both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, insurgencies emerged to challenge 
the Iraqi and Afghan governments, both put in place by the United States after 
its initial invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein and Taliban regimes. 
In Iraq, the United States was slow to respond effectively to the growing insur-
gency and emerging civil war. From 2003 through 2006, American forces tended 
to focus on killing the enemy, transitioning security operations to Iraqi police 
and armed forces, and withdrawing U.S. troops to large bases in Iraq on the 
theory that the American presence was a cause of instability. It essentially took 
the military more than three years to reorient itself to formulate and carry out 
an effective COIN strategy in Iraq.13 
During that time, a cadre of military officers, academics, and analysts con-
tended that the American approach to the Iraqi insurgency and burgeoning civil 
war was poorly executed and fundamentally misconceived. Building on classic 
twentieth-century COIN literature and pointing to early isolated successes that 
some American units had in Iraq, COIN advocates urged U.S. civilian and mili-
tary leaders to fundamentally change course and undertake a robust counterin-
surgency campaign. These COIN advocates contended that U.S. troops should be 
an active presence in Iraqi communities and that the United States should focus 
on protecting the civilian population and politically isolating, rather than kill-
ing, the insurgents. The role of the U.S. military, they claimed, was to make it in 
the self-interest of the population to support the host government rather than 
the insurgents.14 The renewed counterinsurgency campaign undertaken by the 
United States in Iraq starting in 2007 differed significantly from conventional 
military operations. 
Over the course of 2005 and 2006, the call for embracing counterinsur-
gency approaches and principles gained broader and higher-ranking support, 
culminating in the updated and fully revised publication of the U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual in December 2006. Army general 
David Petraeus, who played a key role in overseeing the publication of the field 
manual, led a renewed effort and new approach to the war that embraced these 
COIN principles as he took command of all U.S. and coalition troops deployed in 
Iraq, officially known as Multi-National Force–Iraq, in January 2007. As part of 
this new approach, the Bush administration sent nearly thirty thousand addi-
tional troops to Iraq, in a strategy commonly referred to as “the surge.”
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Small units—special forces teams, companies, platoons, and even squads—
played a central role in this new strategy for the Iraq War. The key feature of 
the 2007 troop surge was not the additional numbers of American troops, but 
how the military deployed these forces. Instead of continuing to cluster troops 
on large, fortified bases that isolated American forces from Iraqis, the military 
embedded small teams of Marines and soldiers in urban areas, often in aban-
doned houses and other buildings.15 Rather than driving through a neighborhood 
“in an armored convoy, day-tripping like a tourist in hell,” before returning back 
to base,16 the military aimed to make small units constant, trusted presences 
within Iraqi communities. This strategic plan placed a premium on activities 
like frequent foot patrols and regular meetings with local leaders. The goal of 
embedding U.S. troops within Iraqi communities was to provide a secure space 
to support political reconciliation and to convince Iraqis that it was in their best 
interest to give the Americans information about insurgents and, more gener-
ally, to support the Iraqi government and coalition forces.17 
David Kilcullen suggested that establishing a constant presence among 
the population—just being there—is an essential component of any successful 
COIN operation.18 Routine activities, particularly nontransactional activities, 
can be surprisingly difficult to document as participants often do not consider 
those activities to merit recording because of their routine nature. For exam-
ple, the daily staff journal, a critical document for capturing the activities of 
units down to the company level in combat zones, is designed primarily to 
capture events and is not meant for staff to “normally enter routine matters.”19 
However, routine, nontransactional, “being there” activities may be among the 
most important of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The complex nature of coun-
terinsurgency warfare, where critical actions are just as likely to take place in a 
brief, impromptu conversation between a civilian and a solider as to occur in a 
firefight, poses many challenging questions. What should we be trying to docu-
ment when preserving the records of a counterinsurgency campaign? Do COIN 
campaigns and traditional warfare require substantially different documenta-
tion strategies? How do we document the routine? 
Army history regulations, including those specifically addressing deployed 
units, identify document types that commanders must preserve. These instruc-
tions, usually presented as a table of document types, are easy to understand 
and are similar to records schedules in many industries. Army history doctrine 
and instructions generally describe appraising records and documenting activi-
ties as “collecting” documents. These document-centric instructions do not 
discuss appraisal and documentation or approaches like functional analysis at 
a strategic level. Even Field Manual 1-20, Military History Operations, which is 
written primarily for army historians, focuses on gathering document types. 
This and other policies thoroughly describe the types of documents to capture 
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and how to capture them.20 However, no significant attention is paid to how 
documenting counterinsurgency operations may pose challenges that differ 
from documenting traditional warfare. For example, army history doctrine and 
policies do not indicate any difference between documenting the 2004 battles 
of Fallujah, which featured large assaults and intense, sustained combat, and 
the 2005 to 2006 counterinsurgency efforts in Tal Afar which, after an initial 
assault, consisted largely of patrolling, meetings and negotiations, improving 
infrastructure and government services, training police forces, and conducting 
targeted raids.
Successful counterinsurgency operations also depend on the effectiveness 
of small military units. The COIN-centric tactics used during the surge in Iraq 
and the mosaic nature of the war—with the state of the insurgency sometimes 
varying from block to block—pushed significant responsibilities down the chain 
of command to captains, lieutenants, noncommissioned officers, and even 
enlisted personnel.21 COIN theorists pressed military leadership to give small 
units like platoons and companies autonomy and the resources necessary to 
respond effectively and quickly to opportunities and threats based on their local 
knowledge of a small, specific area of operation.22 
As small units in COIN operations often have strategic significance beyond 
what their size may suggest, the documentation of counterinsurgencies cannot 
rely solely on records from division or higher headquarters. If “rank is nothing 
. . . [and] talent is everything” in COIN,23 the appraisal of military records needs 
to consider that the records of a smaller unit, such as a company headquarters, 
may, in some circumstances, contain more documentary significance than the 
records of the larger division headquarters. This, of course, is an appraisal chal-
lenge found with the records of any hierarchical organization, not just the mili-
tary. Speaking about government records, Hans Booms noted that one cannot 
“make the a priori assumption that records from a president’s office . . . are 
necessarily more significant than those from the office concerned with social 
security, even though the latter is on a much lower administrative level.”24 
The strategic significance of small actions by small units is also framed by 
the concept of the strategic corporal, a term coined by the commandant of the U.S. 
Marine Corps in 1999 to note the strategic significance of noncommissioned 
and junior officers in asymmetric warfare.25 Documenting the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan requires an understanding of the strategic importance of the 
actions of junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel.26 
Archivists can pair the strategic corporal and COIN principles with the records 
continuum to guide their appraisal decisions on the documentation of COIN 
operations. The records continuum demonstrates how records can be seen as 
not just narrowly documenting particular acts by individuals but also as having 
broad societal implications at the macro level.27 Within the records continuum, 
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archivists are urged to appraise records not only in terms of the records creator, 
but also in terms of the subjects of the records, considering and accounting for 
the plural rights of multiple constituencies.28 This theory highlights the impor-
tance of having a broader understanding of the continuum of relationships 
from record, to act, to activity, to function, to institution, to society. The con-
tinuum and the strategic corporal concepts provide a framework for seeing the 
tactical, strategic, and geopolitical significance of operational military records.
While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have tended to push important 
tactical and strategic decisions down the chain of command, U.S. military his-
tory and archives resources are usually more robust toward the top echelons of 
leadership. Within the U.S. Army, for example, division and higher-level units 
are supposed to have dedicated historians, while units at the brigade and lower 
levels have earmarked historical and archival appraisal activities as an “addi-
tional duty as assigned.”29 Broadly speaking, the U.S. government has scheduled 
a wide range of records from all units involved in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
as having enduring archival value.30 However, as discussed in further detail later 
in this article, the military has encountered significant challenges in attempt-
ing to preserve the records of units deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Understanding the nature of counterinsurgency warfare is just one part of 
developing an appraisal strategy for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Archivists 
also need to understand these wars within the context of how the U.S. military 
serves American society. What functions and activities does the military per-
form on our behalf? This is a deceptively complex question because American 
society expects the military to undertake a wide range of civil affairs activi-
ties overseas, deliver humanitarian aid around the globe, collect and analyze 
intelligence, play an active diplomatic role, patrol U.S. borders, support disaster 
response, and supplement the security of high-risk targets.31 The distinction 
between what the military does and what civilian government agencies do has 
blurred increasingly over the last decade. While the military has engaged in 
more tasks traditionally thought to be civilian activities, civilian agencies, espe-
cially the CIA, have engaged in what would generally be considered combat 
operations.32 In addition to challenging assumptions about what entities sup-
port which functions on behalf of the American people, this blurring of civil and 
military roles also calls into question what we consider to be military opera-
tions and warfare.33 The advent of cyber-warfare, for example, poses serious 
questions about defining the essential elements of state-sponsored warfare.34 
Archivists need to be able to engage with the nature of contemporary war and 
the roles of the armed services to make informed documentation and appraisal 
decisions about the military and its records. 
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The Nature of Military Records
To document the American experience of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
archivists also need to understand the nature of the records that the military 
creates. One of the most challenging characteristics of current military records 
is their volume. Appraisal, accessioning, arrangement, description, and preser-
vation strategies for these records must be scalable if archives are going to suc-
cessfully document American contemporary military operations. Because many 
military records have clearly defined record types with explicit rules for their 
creation and use, archivists may be able to leverage automated systems that 
can parse large volumes of records by their document types to help automate 
appraisal decisions. Any strategy to document the American military experi-
ence in Iraq and Afghanistan will also have to contend with records generated 
in informal settings, such as milblogs,35 online forums, and ad hoc workspaces, 
where the documentary form and warrants for creation are much less explicit. 
In addition, archivists and records managers also face significant appraisal and 
preservation challenges with still and moving image data produced by the mili-
tary and intelligence agencies that lack transactional characteristics. 
The United States military comprises a set of organizations that have 
always produced large volumes of records to support operations. Two long and 
large-scale wars along with advances in information technology have dramati-
cally increased the scale at which the military and intelligence agencies gener-
ate records. For example, in March 2011, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
received forty-six terabytes of operations-level joint forces data from Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.36 The U.S. Army Center of Military History has collected ninety-
two terabytes of records from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.37 In 2010, 
over eighty-five thousand paper-based detainee records from the Iraq War were 
shipped to the United States by the 777th Military Police Detachment of the 
Michigan National Guard to be digitized, cataloged, and processed for use by 
the Pentagon’s National Detainee Reporting Center.38 These are only small slices 
of the U.S. military records documenting the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. One 
defense contractor noted in 2012 that the armed forces “currently have approxi-
mately 7 million computing devices—a number that is expected to double by 
2020.”39 Each of those devices is capable of transmitting, storing, and creating 
records. Generating and collecting terabytes of records have become normal 
processes for the military and intelligence agencies. 
Archivists must be able to manage records from the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars on the terabyte scale. The successful management and preservation of these 
records will require a variety of approaches that combine archival practices with 
a range of tools that can scale this work. Ideally, institutions would manage 
records effectively in robust electronic recordkeeping systems, and archivists 
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would use analytic tools to support scalable assessment, identification, classifi-
cation, and other parsing and encoding work.40 William Underwood’s work at 
the Georgia Tech Research Institute in partnership with the National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA) provides an example of such an approach. 
Underwood and his colleagues built upon the diplomatics concept of documen-
tary form to enable NARA archivists to rapidly appraise and describe hundreds 
of thousands of electronic presidential records in months rather than the years 
it would take to do this work manually. Underwood and his research partners 
developed XML encoded context-free grammars that define the documentary 
form of presidential memos. The grammars combine wordlists and semantic 
tagging of sample records to allow NARA to sort and classify presidential memos 
for their evidential value and security clearance concerns.41
Many military operational records are highly structured documents explic-
itly defined by rules. This suggests that they could be good candidates for 
approaches based on documentary form. Underwood’s work suggests that an 
analysis of record types that examines their documentary form and function 
could be a promising strategy for appraising large volumes of military records. 
This approach is particularly important for operational records that may need 
to be appraised at the individual level for classification review or other reasons. 
Developing machine-readable definitions of document types should enable 
archivists to leverage digital tools to help them appraise records documenting 
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future conflicts. 
Any appraisal strategy for these records must also have the flexibility to 
recognize that many military records are now created in informal ad hoc envi-
ronments that lack rules, structures, and warrants. During the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, officers and troops frequently used informal spaces to conduct 
their work, even though those spaces often were not acknowledged or codified 
in formal recordkeeping rules and guidelines. Records related to the continued 
use of synchronous, text-based chat such as mIRC42 by military command-and-
control centers during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are significant to 
understanding how soldiers and commanders communicate on the battlefield. 
Lack of standardized tools, regulations, official support, and sponsorship for 
documenting these informal communications platforms means that critical 
information related to decisions made in-theater could be lost. In 2003, real-
time chat became a core communications vehicle for command and control. 
During the first year of combat operations in Iraq, approximately twenty-five 
hundred chat users participated in over four hundred chat rooms to exchange 
tactical and situational information.43 
Social media is another type of informal, lightweight, easy to implement 
recordkeeping environment that the military community uses extensively. The 
military’s embrace of social media channels, however, has not always been 
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easy. The development of personal military blogs (milblogs) exposed tensions 
between the military establishment and the individual. Written by active duty 
soldiers, the early scope of milblog activities provided an outlet for the personal 
experiences of war, in much the same way as diaries and letters functioned 
during previous conflicts.44 Gaining popularity as places to share and read an 
“unfiltered” account of activities in a combat zone, these information spaces 
eventually coalesced into a linked, broader milblog community that includes 
military spouses, recent veterans, security analysts, military historians, and 
other members of the broader military community.45 Because soldier-authored 
milblogs are, for the most part, scattered, unofficial creations of individuals, 
they are not captured as part of official documentation of the experiences of 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The varied form, structure, and presentation 
of these informal creations also blocks their potential capture, preservation, 
access, and use. 
Several other informal environments have come to serve as digital “water-
ing holes” for personal knowledge transfer between military leaders. Two 
examples are the websites CompanyCommand.com and PlatoonLeader.com. 
Established by officers seeking to share their command experiences and learn 
from others, these unofficial forums represent a recorded piece of the commu-
nication that occurs between officers about their professional lives, decisions, 
and leadership.46 The discussions mirror an older model of personal and pro-
fessional knowledge transfer through interpersonal conversations and expand 
the usefulness of this information exchange about leadership, experiences, and 
training by enabling it to be shared with a broader network of people over time 
and space. Peer-to-peer conversations on websites such as Company Command 
and Platoon Leader form a bridge between leadership, unit, and officer knowl-
edge, and they allow for the management and expansion of knowledge about 
particular situations and experiences.47
The widespread use of these forums and communications tools by officers 
reflects the reality that crucial information travels outside of traditional, hier-
archical systems in the military. Officers and enlisted personnel use a mix of 
informal and formal environments to best support their work. Members of the 
military frequently find that informal spaces are more effective than formal 
systems for quickly creating and sharing information and supporting the work 
of ad hoc groups. This workplace reality is common to most industries. While 
the military is a hierarchical organization, it is also complex. Military records do 
not merely move up and down a simple chain of command, and many records 
that provide critical documentation of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
produced informally. For example, one of the most critical records documenting 
the development of the American COIN strategy in Iraq is a short PowerPoint 
presentation featuring stick figures that tells a story of defeating insurgents 
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in Al Anbar province.48 In another example, David Kilcullen’s “‘Twenty-Eight 
Articles’: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” a cornerstone in 
the current American COIN literature, started out as an email message before it 
became an article in Military Review.49 Archival appraisal strategies must account 
for this messy, dynamic mix of formal and informal recordkeeping environ-
ments, otherwise archives and records management programs will not have the 
flexibility to understand the significance of the full spectrum of records created 
during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. 
Another recordkeeping challenge emerging from these two wars is the 
management of observational data. The U.S. military and intelligence commu-
nity must now manage vast quantities of moving and still image observational 
data recorded by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other recording plat-
forms such as unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), armored vehicles, and sol-
diers’ helmets. For example, the number of the U.S. military’s unmanned and 
remotely piloted aircraft—commonly called drones—has risen sharply over the 
past decade, from fifty-four operational U.S. Army unmanned aircraft in October 
2001 (the start of operations in Afghanistan) to more than four thousand UAVs 
carrying out surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence missions in 2010.50 
Recently deployed by the U.S. Air Force in Afghanistan, a new wide-area surveil-
lance sensor named “Gorgon Stare” is intended for the capture of “citywide” 
data. Able to transmit panoramic views to soldiers in real time, this remotely 
piloted aircraft is equipped with nine cameras that shoot two frames per second 
and generate mountains of data.51 
Effectively analyzing these data troves for planning, lessons learned, and 
actionable intelligence has been a core challenge for the military and intel-
ligence agencies.52 In April 2012, U.S. Air Force secretary Michael Donley noted 
that one reason for not immediately adding many more unmanned aerial vehi-
cles to current operations was an attempt to catch up with the backlog of col-
lected data.53 The core challenge related to these oceans of data is familiar to 
archivists and records managers: finding ways to sort, retrieve, and navigate 
information that could be relevant to current or future use. Existing visual 
intelligence algorithms can collate and process collected data, but still require 
human judgment to make decisions and draw conclusions. 
Research is underway to develop methods to harness intelligence from 
this data. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
has initiated a research program called “Mind’s Eye” to develop smart cameras 
that will be capable of recognizing, describing, and predicting human activities 
using machine-based artificial intelligence.54 Early reports of this research at 
Carnegie Mellon University included the classification of human actions into 
verbs that can be applied within an ontological framework for identification.55 
Like William Underwood’s work at Georgia Tech, this research is developing 
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machine-readable, scalable processes for making analytic decisions for classi-
fying, characterizing, tagging, and applying rules and actions to data. These 
tools and processes must still be informed by policy decisions made by humans. 
However, while these and other tools are essential to applying appraisal policies 
to these data, they do not replace the human act of appraisal. Archivists will 
need to ask what these observational data troves are documenting. Does moving 
image data from a UAV attacking Taliban forces in Afghanistan merit enduring 
preservation? What about video of Taliban forces or American forces that are 
not engaged in a firefight? What about moving or still image data of terrain 
that does not contain any people, fortifications, or evidence of activity, such as 
vehicle tracks? Archivists and the military will have to consider if observational 
data has additional applications beyond supporting combat and intelligence 
operations. Does it support the development of doctrine and post-action lessons 
learned? Does it support historical analysis of the Iraq and Afghanistan con-
flicts? Does it support other research, such as environmental studies? Does the 
long-term evidentiary and research value of these data outweigh their enduring 
preservation and access costs? 
The Nature of Recordkeeping in Deployed Units
Beyond the appraisal challenge of determining the nature and functional 
role of counterinsurgency operations and the archival management and pres-
ervation challenges that these war records present, this nation has faced the 
more fundamental challenge of enabling its military to consistently create and 
protect the records of its engagement in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In a 
series of 2012 ProPublica articles, Peter Sleeth described how the military has 
been unable to save significant portions of its operational records from the two 
wars, especially those created before 2009.56 The documentary record of many 
units deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan appears to be remarkably poor. The U.S. 
Army Center of Military History, for example, claimed that as of the end of 2008 
it did not have sufficient records to write an “adequate . . . history” for over 
ninety army units that had deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.57 A NARA assess-
ment in 2010 revealed that the military did not know the “volume, location, size 
and format” of records of Iraq-deployed units and that there were “large gaps in 
the records holding of CENTCOM and Service Components” in Iraq.58 
These documentation gaps present significant problems for the military, its 
service members and veterans, and our broader society. For the military, miss-
ing records hinder its development of lessons learned, training, and doctrine. 
Operational records provide the basis for unit histories, which are an important 
component of troop morale and establishing esprit de corps. For service mem-
bers and veterans, operational records provide evidence for commendations and 
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citations and are critical for protecting veterans’ rights to heath care and other 
benefits. Veterans’ advocacy groups have raised concerns about how missing 
records threaten these rights, and this issue has garnered congressional atten-
tion.59 More generally, these records play a critical role in the private memories 
of veterans and their families and the public memory of American society—
to say nothing of the importance of these records for the people of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
What caused these large gaps in the American record of these two wars? 
Confusion over recordkeeping authority, shortcomings in military records man-
agement capacity, concerns over operational security, and competing priorities 
all appear to have contributed to this problem. The 2010 NARA report indicated 
significant confusion and disagreement over recordkeeping responsibilities 
between CENTCOM and the branch services. This is caused, in part, by a lack of 
“clear guidelines regarding” records ownership.60 These disagreements have led 
to the poor management, and even loss, of records.61 
The intense operational pace of the past decade also appears to have signif-
icantly challenged the military’s—in particular the army’s—capacity to manage 
its records effectively. In a 2009 report, Richard W. Stewart, chief historian of 
the U.S. Army Center of Military History, gave a brief historical overview of 
records management in the army and claimed that administrative changes and 
an increased focus on IT issues led to a “decline in Army record-keeping train-
ing and policy enforcement and a resulting decrease in the preservation of unit 
operational data.”62 In Iraq and Afghanistan, evidence suggests that the military 
did not ramp up its records management capacity to meet the demands of two 
simultaneous wars. The 2010 NARA assessment of Iraq War records noted that 
CENTCOM did not have “a fully implemented records management program” 
or plans to retire records from the war.63 Guidance on capturing records had 
not been “fully implemented or disseminated” by 2010.64 While many high-level 
directives were issued about preserving records, Stewart claimed that these 
directives were not integrated with detailed procedures, training, and enforce-
ment components as part of a “comprehensive, effective program.”65 Indeed, 
despite general orders from the Pentagon and various military leaders to pre-
serve operational records, many senior commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have not made this a point of emphasis.66 In his 2009 report, Stewart also noted 
that “commanders of deployed units . . . [claim that] they lack the expertise, time, 
and manpower to comply with what to them is an administrative burden.”67 
The lack of focused time and personnel resources available for recordkeep-
ing combined with myriad competing demands on deployed officers and non-
commissioned officers have frequently made the retention and preservation of 
operational records a comparatively low priority. As the size of units gets smaller 
down the chain of command, it is not unusual for officers, NCOs, and enlisted 
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personnel to take on multiple functions as needed. Preserving records, particu-
larly at the lower levels of command, becomes—like many tasks—“another duty 
as assigned”68 that competes with other priorities, such as combat engagements, 
force protection, logistics, intelligence operations, and civil affairs. While the 
army encourages commanders of units as small as companies to designate a 
commissioned or noncommissioned officer as their unit historians, this is still 
an additional duty.69 Even when a unit has a designated historian, that officer 
or NCO will still have a multitude of tasks that are frequently more pressing 
and often perceived as more important than preserving documents. While the 
preservation of these records is critically important to the military and to pro-
tecting the rights and benefits of enlisted personnel and officers, these benefits 
can seem remote to troops engaged in complex, hectic, and dangerous combat 
and COIN operations. A RAND Corporation analyst noted, “in combat, battalion 
staffs tend to be shorthanded, overworked, and likely to focus only on those 
tasks that are going to prove useful to their primary mission.”70 Many of the 
army’s history manuals emphasize the importance of history, suggesting that 
many officers need to be convinced that recordkeeping and documentation are 
more than just bothersome administrative duties.71
In addition, officers have career incentives that discourage them from 
putting in the extra work to ensure the preservation of their unit’s records. 
Usually officers advance their careers by accomplishing operational missions, 
not through exemplary recordkeeping. More specifically, concerns and con-
fusion over operational security have encouraged units deployed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to destroy rather than save records. It appears that confusion over 
whether units could transport classified records back to American bases or per-
haps hypersensitivity to protecting classified records has led to the destruction 
of a notable volume of operational records.72 In addition, restrictions on the use 
of portable storage devices have brought some records collection efforts by his-
tory units to a halt.73 Because breaching operational security (OPSEC) can have a 
detrimental effect on an officer’s career and potentially deadly consequences for 
troops on the ground, officers have every incentive to err on the side of OPSEC 
caution. These circumstances have led to the destruction of records that should 
have been preserved. 
The military has not been without some preservation successes. In 
2009, NARA formed the War Records Group, which has worked closely with 
CENTCOM to identify operational records for enduring retention. CENTCOM 
took extensive measures to secure approximately fifty terabytes of records and 
is preparing them for their future transfer to NARA. In addition, CENTCOM 
has been actively working on capturing and preserving records since 2006.74 
In an effort to improve the recordkeeping culture of the Marine Corps, the 
Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections successfully included training 
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for writing command chronologies into the curriculum of the Expeditionary 
Warfare School.75
Military History Detachments (MHDs) are another bright spot in the effort 
to preserve military records from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. MHDs have 
gone to extraordinary lengths to collect copies of records, take notes at meet-
ings, conduct interviews of key personnel, and write short histories of opera-
tions. In some instances, it appears that these MHDs have collected the only 
extant copies of unit records.76 Much of the success of MHDs appears to hinge on 
the persuasiveness and perseverance of the individuals in these detachments.77 
Such attributes are needed to overcome the reluctance of some commanding 
officers of deployed units to cooperate with MHDs or have historians attached to 
their units. The Military History Operations army field manual dryly notes, “opera-
tional commands do not always fully appreciate the benefits and value of taking 
historians with them during their operations.”78 
Despite these efforts, MHDs are not a scalable solution for systematically 
documenting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or other military operations. 
MHDs are typically three-person teams, and, as of 2009, twenty-four MHDs had 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan.79 In addition to MHDs, small teams from the 
Center for Army Lessons Learned and other military centers and contractors 
such as the RAND Corporation are also sent to the field to collect documents 
and interviews.80 This assortment of teams does not have the capacity to cap-
ture records systematically. For example, when the 305th MHD deployed to 
Afghanistan in 2007, it was the only MHD in the country and the first histori-
cal unit in Afghanistan in over three years.81 In addition, the core mission of 
the MHDs, along with unit historians at the division or higher levels, is to col-
lect documents and interviews to support the creation of unit and operational 
histories. While they have captured critical documents, these efforts are not 
fully integrated with military records management efforts to manage all records 
appropriately and capture all records of enduring value systematically.
The military’s documentation of its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
gained broader attention since publication of the 2012 ProPublica series.82 In par-
ticular, Congress asked the Department of Defense to answer a series of ques-
tions about gaps in the records of deployed units.83 The U.S. Army acknowledged 
that gaps currently exist in its operational records from Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In a letter to two members of Congress, the secretary of the army conceded that 
“although numerous directives have been issued to emphasize the importance 
of the preservation of records, these directives unfortunately were often over-
come by other operational priorities and not fully overseen by commanders.”84 
The secretary pointed to “the austere, hostile environment and high operational 
tempo” of the wars as the primary causes of these recordkeeping shortcom-
ings.85 In an effort to close those gaps, the secretary of the army and the army 
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chief of staff issued a July 1, 2013, memorandum ordering all army elements 
that served in Iraq and Afghanistan to copy and transfer all of their operational 
records to the U.S. Army Center of Military History by December 31, 2013.86 
The memo noted that the goal of this effort was to “establish a consolidated 
Armywide repository of war records.” The Center of Military History, in coor-
dination with the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency, 
“will be responsible for structuring and organizing the records and determining 
the ‘completeness’ of Army operational records” from the two wars.87
The specter of the military’s failure to document properly its operations 
in the 1990–1991 Gulf War hangs over the current effort to document the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars. In its current history regulations and doctrine, the 
army uses the failure of the military to properly document activities in the Gulf 
War as a reminder to unit commanders of the importance of preserving records. 
One guide noted that poor recordkeeping during Operation Desert Storm forced 
the army to spend millions of dollars to reconstruct where and when units and 
individuals were located to investigate the causes and medical claims for Gulf 
War syndrome suffered by many deployed troops.88 Another army handbook on 
managing operational records for unit commanders begins with a page-long 
narrative about the problems caused by poor recordkeeping in the Gulf War. 
The handbook noted that troops suffering from Gulf War syndrome “faced an 
uphill struggle in proving they were anywhere near combat operations or even 
in the theater at all” because records were not properly kept.89 The U.S. mili-
tary clearly has an institutional memory of its recordkeeping and preservation 
shortcomings in the Gulf War. In fact, just as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
have reinvigorated the memory and debate over the Vietnam War within the 
military and throughout our society, the military’s current documentation and 
preservation challenges seem to have refreshed the memory of the military’s 
Gulf War recordkeeping woes. This memory, however, does not appear to have 
been enough to prevent some of these failings from happening again.
Conclusion
This article looked at three core challenges of documenting the American 
military experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Understanding the nature of these 
wars is critical to making informed appraisal decisions about the military records 
produced during these conflicts and for developing approaches that effectively 
address the myriad challenges related to these and future counterinsurgency 
and peacekeeping operations. Archivists and records managers must grapple 
with the immense volume and complexity of these records. Part of the challenge 
of documenting these conflicts also has been overcoming the difficulties in sys-
tematically creating, managing, and protecting operational records in-theater 
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and safely transferring them to preservation environments. Any effort to docu-
ment a conflict will take multiple archives to preserve the spectrum of personal 
and official war records.90 Archivists must also engage with records managers 
and records creators during armed conflicts to make arrangements for the com-
prehensive preservation of operational records. Effectively documenting con-
flicts also requires addressing systemic recordkeeping challenges within the 
U.S. military. Deployed officers do not have the incentives to ensure the careful 
management and preservation of their operational records. The military must 
change these incentive structures or implement technologies that make the 
easiest recordkeeping choice for officers the best recordkeeping choice for the 
records. The records community needs to partner with the military to develop 
processes that shorten the path from the battlefield to the archives.  
Records declassification and government secrecy more broadly are beyond 
the scope of this article, but this issue clearly affects the documentation and 
collective memory of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and other conflicts. Large 
military operations are relatively open and transparent activities compared to 
limited logistical and aerial support, small training and advisor efforts, clan-
destine operations, cyber-warfare, and the use of contractors and other third-
party actors that the American government now seems to favor. Addressing the 
challenge of government secrecy is another important aspect of documenting 
American foreign policy and overseas operations.91 Although government leaks 
have existed throughout American history, WikiLeaks has pushed this issue to 
the fore and challenged archivists to think deeply about the role of records and 
secrecy in documenting government activities.92
Concern over veterans’ rights may significantly improve the systematic 
documentation of military operations. As the U.S. military has disengaged from 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the concern over the preservation of oper-
ational records has become an important issue for veterans’ rights. The absence 
of operational records presents significant obstacles to veterans trying to claim 
their medical benefits. Veterans’ advocacy groups and congressional com-
mittees on veterans’ affairs are driving current concerns in Washington over 
the military’s recordkeeping shortcomings.93 Missing or incomplete military 
records are usually discussed in conjunction with the Veterans Administration’s 
recordkeeping challenges and the delays that veterans face in receiving benefits. 
Framing the management and preservation of military records as a veterans’ 
rights issue may be the most effective strategy for marshaling the necessary 
political will to improve military recordkeeping.94 
The goal of this essay is not only to help foster and frame a discussion 
about effective strategies to document America’s engagement in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars, but also to engage in an active conversation about document-
ing conflicts and other complex endeavors—such as addressing the challenges 
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of protecting human rights, reducing crime, improving education, and alleviat-
ing poverty—undertaken by large, dynamic institutions in the twenty-first cen-
tury. This work requires a full spectrum of skills and actions. Archivists need to 
understand the messy functions of large organizations and the nature of com-
plex events. They need to partner with records creators to develop and imple-
ment recordkeeping systems that facilitate records preservation and be tools 
people want to use to support their daily work. Archivists need to use tools 
that can parse and process large volumes of records. Finally, archivists need to 
understand the role of these records in the development of a society’s collective 
memory because “who gets remembered with monuments and who gets erased 
from history depends to some substantial degree on archivists and the records 
they preserve.”95 
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